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In the Harvard ILJ Vol 59(2), authors Courtney Hillebrecht and Alexandra Huneeus, with 
Sandra Borda, argue in “The Judicialization of Peace” that the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in their positive engagements with 
Colombia’s long-running internal conflict, have “facilitated and hastened a change in the 
settled norms around transitional justice.” They posit that this hastening has been achieved 
through a long series of dialogues between courts—both internal and international—and 
government, and among non-state actors, such as NGOs, the media and academia. The 
authors use the term “shadow effect” to describe the engagement of the courts, particularly 
the ICC, with the peace process in a way which nurtured transition within a framework of 
legal accountability. 
The authors point out that this outcome confounded expectations because, during four years 
of negotiations, many had predicted that the involvement of the two courts would impede the 
peace process. The Colombian experiment is certainly instructive, but can it be seen as a 
blueprint for changing “the settled norms of transitional justice?”  As the authors of the 
article point out, “Colombia has more stable institutions and a stronger domestic judiciary 
than any other situation before the ICC.” This post will query whether any of the lessons 
from Colombia are applicable to sub-Saharan Africa, where the ICC has focused all of its 
prosecutions, and whose states, in the main, suffer from weak institutions and destabilizing 
ethnic contestation. 
I have drawn this blog from qualitative research, funded by the British Academy, into the 
engagement of the ICC with two East African states, Kenya and Uganda, where the court has 
been seen as anything but a midwife of accountability. My research included some thirty 
semi-structured interviews with civil society representatives, including judges and advocates, 
about the ICC and the so-called “impunity gap” in Africa. I supplement this ethnography with 
more general observations about the performance of the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP) over a decade and a half. 
 
Sparring with the ICC 
A plethora of explanations have been offered for Africa’s growing disaffection with the ICC. 
Mueller suggests that initial support for the court was strong as long as its investigations 
centered on non-state actors such as the Lord’s Resistance Army, but when the focus shifted 
toward ex-heads of state and even serving presidents, self-preservation became the dominant 
response. This ICC challenge to the principle of immunity from prosecution for leaders and 
senior officials for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is anathema to the 
African Union (AU) and was condemned by the Assembly of the AU, meeting in Equatorial 
Guinea in July 2014.  
For Evelyne Owiye Osaala, primary responsibility lies with the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
for being “selective in the recognition and waiver of immunities for international crimes in 
favour of the interests of its permanent members.” This argument is commonly voiced on the 
African continent by those who believe that President George W. Bush and Prime Minister 
Tony Blair should have been held to account legally for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. For 
many, the thesis that the UNSC demonstrates partiality was strengthened by the capture of 
the former Ivory Coast president, Laurent Gbagbo, by French and American troops in 2011 
when Paris and Washington demonstrably threw their weight behind Gbagbo’s election 
opponent, Alessane Outtara.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
By contrast, Nel and Sibiya point out that the ICC has opened preliminary investigations in 
Iraq, Colombia, Afghanistan and Georgia, “thereby dispelling the myth that the ICC only 
focuses on situations in Africa.” 
 
The Bashir Effect  
All of these assessments have merit, but the real issue is whether a subtler approach by the 
OTP, relying on a “shadow effect” rather than confrontation, might have done more to 
challenge long-cherished presumptions of the inviolability of presidents on the continent. It is 
undeniable that the March 2009 issuing of an ICC warrant for the arrest of Sudanese 
president, Omar al-Bashir, began the process of framing the court as an instrument of 
Western colonialism, a viewpoint summed up by the Gambia’s then Information Minister, 
Sheriff Baba Bojang, who reportedly called the ICC “an international Caucasian court for the 
persecution and humiliation of people of colour, especially Africans.”  
The indictment did not deter Bashir from successfully testing the concept of impunity by 
visiting Nigeria for an African Union summit in 2013 and South Africa in 2015. The visit 
which provided the impetus for this research study was Bashir’s visit to Uganda in 2016, 
when he attended the re-inauguration of President Museveni. At the ceremony, the Ugandan 
leader’s attack on the ICC as “a bunch of useless people”, provoked a walkout by the 
ambassadors of the US and Canada. 
Like South Africa, Uganda had once been a proponent of the ICC and, indeed, was the first 
country to refer a case—that of the Lord’s Resistance Army leader, Joseph Kony—to the 
court, after it came into being in 2002. Announcing the referral, Museveni and the ICC 
Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo appeared at a joint press conference in London, which an 
opposition member of parliament in Uganda criticized as a misstep because it gave the 
impression that the OTP was doing the bidding of the Ugandan president. As if to assert his 
independence, Ocampo followed this up with a visit to Kampala at which he declared that he 
would “interpret the referral as concerning all crimes under the Rome Statute committed in 
Northern Uganda, leaving open the possibility of investigating alleged atrocities by 
government forces.” 
It is true that Ocampo’s dealings with Colombia also opened up the possibility that the army, 
as well as the FARC rebels, might come under investigation from the court but crucially, the 
Colombian government eschewed a strategy of confrontation with the OTP for one of 
“judicial diplomacy.” This entailed cooperating with all requests for information and for 
meetings with the OTP during field visits and in 2009, adopting the Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure of the ICC and ratifying the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
Court.  
This deft legal courtship between Colombia’s institutions and the OTP made it unnecessary 
for one side to be seen as a supplicant and the other as a potential punisher. By contrast, in 
East Africa, a civil society with far shallower roots used the ICC indictment against Sudan’s 
Bashir to lock horns with leaderships determined to uphold the immunity of heads of state, 
with predictable consequences. When Bashir made a return state visit to Uganda in 
November 2017, the Uganda Victims Foundation could have had little hope of success when 
filing an application at the International Crimes Division of the High Court for enforcement 
of the outstanding arrest warrants. The court duly declined to issue a provisional warrant and 
instead fixed the hearing to a later date, “effectively quashing any attempts to arrest the 
Sudanese president.” 
 
The Kenyatta/Ruto Prosecution 
As the “Judicialization of Peace” makes clear, the OTP could plausibly present the opening 
of a preliminary investigation in Colombia as a means of facilitating and nurturing the peace 
process. In Kenya, by contrast, the OTP failed to persuade the then government to voluntarily 
refer the post-election violence of 2007 to the ICC and so the prosecutor, for the first time in 
the court’s history, had to use his proprio motu powers to initiate an investigation. The 
danger of thus “owning” the intervention—which led to indictments against President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto—was that the OTP would be as much on trial as were 
the defendants. 
In 2007, Kenyatta and Ruto were bitter opponents and their tribal communities—Kenyatta’s 
Kikuyu and Ruto’s Kalenjin—engaged in bloodshed which led to more than one thousand 
deaths, mainly in the Rift Valley. But, for the 2013 election, while under indictment from the 
ICC, they formed an alliance which effectively subverted the notion of “victim-centered 
justice,” so central to the ICC’s mandate. A report by the civil society alliance, Kenyans for 
Peace with Truth and Justice, put it like this: 
In a strange ironical reversal, Mr Kenyatta and Mr Ruto now presented themselves as 
victims, the hapless targets of an imperialistic plot against Africans. A plot, moreover, 
that would ultimately undermine democracy in Africa by blocking reconciliation 
efforts, such as those that the political alliance headed by Uhuru, representing the 
Kikuyus, and Ruto, representing the Kalenjins was purportedly trying to achieve. In 
turn, the ICC was cast as the pliant tool of a Western conspiracy against Kenya’s 
sovereignty. 
 
The Weakness of the Office of the Prosecutor 
When the trial began in The Hague, it became apparent early on that the OTP was struggling. 
The prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, later complained that over half the witnesses in the case 
against William Ruto withdrew or retracted their initial testimony, and others were killed or 
bribed in the Kenyatta case: 
The level of interference with those witnesses was such that it started before; it was 
maintained throughout the cases; and even after. My office was trying to find various 
ways to protect and preserve the evidence and bring it before the judges This was a 
huge challenge, including their own protection as well as that of most of their 
families. We were having to protect witnesses even against their own communities; it 
became very complicated in the end. Not only were the witnesses pulling away from 
the case, but there were even attempts at interfering with their family members.  
Lawyers interviewed for this research argue that the OTP should have expected this level of 
non-cooperation, which makes its determination to go ahead with the prosecution all the more 
surprising (a similar interpretation can be made about the case against Laurent Gbagbo which 
also collapsed at trial in early 2019). Here again, by exercising its “shadow effect,” the ICC 
may have a more potent, if less showy, weapon than by prosecuting. After all, faced with an 
unwillingness to cooperate by a state, the OTP has none of the resources available to a 
domestic prosecutor, such as subpoenas, surveillance and policing, and cannot visit the 
scenes where the crimes were perpetrated without the acquiescence of national state 
authorities.  
In the Kenyatta case, requests for information from the Kenyan authorities went unanswered 
and the Attorney-General refused to hand over phone, land and asset records. But lawyer, 
Gary Summers, who was part of the Kenyatta defense team from August 2011 onwards, 
believes the OTP can’t escape blame for the failure of the prosecution: 
It was amateurish. You can’t just rely on human rights NGOs to find witnesses and 
interview them.  You needed trained investigators on the ground in Kenya to check 
the sources of some of the allegations. The OTP relied far too heavily on the report of 
the Waki Commission [the commission set up by the Kenyan government in 2008 to 
investigate the post-election violence of the previous year] to find witnesses. Indeed, 
the case against Kenyatta started with a single informant, Witness, no 4. The ICC 
needs a prosecutor who is ruthlessly focused on the target. This wasn’t the case with 
either Ocampo or Fatou Bensouda (Interview with author, October 29, 2016). 
Edigah Kavulavu of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya Section, supported the 
prosecutions but remains disappointed by the way they turned out: 
The general mood here was that we would get justice through the ICC. And that the 
Kenyan case would be an example to the rest of the world. But the OTP only had a 
small outreach office in Nairobi, from where witnesses were interviewed. And there 
was no proper profiling of victims. The OTP based its judgements about 
witnesses/victims almost entirely on information from civil society NGOs. And when 
the case finally opened in court, it was obvious that Ocampo was not trial-ready 
(Interview with researchers, November 1, 2016). 
Searching for any positive legacy of the Kenyatta/Ruto prosecution, it should be noted that it 
was the catalyst for discussions leading to the setting up of an International Crimes Division 
in Kenya’s High Court to make good on the promise of complementarity.  
Likewise in Uganda, following the 2008 Juba Peace Agreement between the government and 
the Lord’s Resistance Army, a war crimes division was established in the High Court (later 
rebranded, when Uganda adopted the International Criminal Court Act, as the International 
Crimes Division). Nevertheless, the performance of the ICC in Africa has been a poor one, as 
it continues to grapple with the ongoing geo-political turbulence of internecine and inter-state 
rivalries. 
 
The Individual or the Community? 
This blog has sought to examine the fractious relationship between the ICC and Africa 
through the prism of the “judicialization of peace” achieved in Colombia. It has pointed out 
the significant differences between a state with relatively stable institutions underpinned by a 
self-confident civil society and countries where the impunity of leaders may have been 
challenged but not overturned. But there is another distinction which has to be considered. 
The ICC was established to try crimes committed by individuals rather than states, and in 
prosecuting Uhuru Kenyatta, the ICC addressed his individual criminal liability for crimes 
committed during the 2007 post-election violence rather than putting the state of Kenya on 
trial. However, within Kenyan society, Kenyatta’s individuality is intimately bound up with a 
heritage of Kikuyu patrimonial obligations.  Historically in this patron-client arrangement, 
there is “a shared understanding of the appropriate relationship between leaders and their 
communities that gave rise to complex moral economies in which rulers were expected to 
provide for their followers in return for their support.” 
In Uganda, Museveni, from the Bahima tribe, is seen as a bulwark against the “troublesome” 
Acholi of the northern region (from which the Lord’s Resistance Army sprang). In other 
words, in these East African countries, a criminal prosecution of the patron can be presented 
as an attack on the clan, raising the possibility of all those dependent on the patron being 
deprived of material benefits and political influence if he is brought down. In these 
circumstances, it was all too easy for the embattled Kenyatta to make a case that, as the 
representative of the largest ethnic group, he embodied the nation, standing resolute against 
an alien, Western-backed institution, the ICC. With the African Union implacably opposed to 
the court, the post-Enlightenment notion of individual responsibility and culpability is 
steadily being reinterpreted on the African continent as a concept of collective condemnation 
and the ICC made to look like the cuckoo in the nest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
